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To What Extent Can a Municipal Government Regulate Federal Undertaking 
Within Its Territory: 
A review of Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co., 2016 SCC 54 
 
 
Abstract 
Municipal governments were in existence in Canada before the United Kingdom 
Parliament enacted British North America Act, 1840 (3 & 4 Victoria, c.35) to unify Upper and 
Lower Canada. Yet, drafters of the of the law and the subsequent British North America Act 1867 
30 & 31 Victoria, c.3 (UK) (“Constitution Act, 1867”) that sets the foundation for Canada 
government did not consider it worthwhile to regard Municipal government as a distinct branch of 
government. Section 92 (8) Constitution Act, 1867 empowered the Province to dictate rules and 
policies governing the existence and functioning of their Municipal governments. This carte 
blanche, often referred to as Dillon’s rule,1 suggests Municipal governments exist at the mercy of 
Provincial government. In R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at 688, Iacobucci J. commented 
that “Municipalities are entirely the creatures of provincial statutes. Accordingly, they can exercise 
only those powers which are explicitly conferred upon them by the province.” Although s.91 
Constitution Act 1867 spelled out Federal power while Provincial powers are described under s.92, 
one of the backdrops of the Constitution is that there are areas of power that are neither allocated 
to the Federal government nor to Provincial governments. Thus, the rule that the Province can only 
dictate the power that it has to the Municipal government is unclear.2 
                                                          
1 See Ottawa Electric Light Co. v Ottawa (City), [1906] O.J No. 60 at para 40 
2 See Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, “Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status” 
(2006) 44:3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 409. 
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As a Federal state, Companies and businesses in Canada can choose to register under 
Federal or Provincial law unless otherwise restricted. One of the advantages of being federally 
incorporated is the ability to operate throughout the Dominion without being unnecessary 
subjected to Provincial law or Municipal bylaws. Municipal councils responsible for local matters, 
often make targeted and general bylaws. Tension sometimes ensue when companies engaging in 
federal undertakings3 refuse to follow bylaws in the guise of federal immunity. In Windsor (City) 
v. Canadian Transit Co., 2016 SCC 54, Canada Transit challenged a bylaw that compelled it to 
repair some of its acquired buildings. Although the Supreme Court of Canada did not rule on 
whether the bylaw apply to Canada Transit, the finding that Federal court had no jurisdiction to 
hear the company’s challenge, impliedly suggests the bylaw is applicable. 
This research into the origin, scope, and importance of Municipal bylaws critically 
examined the Supreme Court decision in Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit, conducted a 
comparative jurisprudence legal analysis, and discussed the applicability of bylaws to Federal 
undertakings in the context of Canada Constitution. The research found, to some extent, Federal 
undertakers are not immune form Municipal bylaws. The degree of control that Municipalities 
have over Federal project undertaker will depend on the nature of the activity the undertaker is 
carrying on, and the effect of the bylaw on the free performance of that activity. The research 
concluded, although Municipal bylaw plays a significant role in Canada legal system, the ability 
of the Province to do whatever it wants, makes the future of Municipalities and their ability to 
reach out to Canadian locals uncertain. 
                                                          
3 Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c. L-2 , s.2 defines undertakings as “any work, undertaking or business that is 
within the legislative authority of Parliament, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, … (b) a 
railway, canal, telegraph or other work or undertaking connecting any province with any other province, or 
extending beyond the limits of a province”. 
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1. Introduction 
Historically, “elected local government was first introduced in Nova Scotia in 1841 with 
the Incorporation of Halifax. In 1848, Nova Scotia became the first colony to be given responsible 
government”.4 Similarly, “Municipal government in Ontario traces its origin to the 
recommendations in the report of Lord Durham (1839), and the District Councils Act 1841 was 
the first measure of local self-government in the province’.5 Contemporarily, Municipal 
government in Canada is traceable to the Municipal Corporations Act, 1849, 12 Victoria. c. 81 
(“the 1849 Act”). This Act, often refereed to as the Baldwin Act, is considered “the Magna Charta 
of municipal government in Canada”.6 The Act enabled the establishment of Municipal 
Corporations and the regulation of Police in and for the several Counties, Cities, Towns, 
Townships and Villages in Upper Canada. The subsequent Constitution Act 1867 recognised 
Federal and the Provinces as the two distinct levels of government. Section 92(8) explicitly placed 
the control of Municipal governments’ affairs with the Provinces.  
In Citizens' legal challenge Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General of) (1997), 36 OR (3d) 733, 
the appellants challenged the legality of Bill 103, the City of Toronto Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 2 that 
created the megacity on the ground that it offends against their Charter rights and was ultravires 
of the Province’ s.92 (8) power. Delivering the Court’ unanimous verdict, Abella J.A referred to 
the Privy Council decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Attorney General of Dominion, [1896] 
A.C. 348 (P.C.) where it was held at pp. 363-64 that “s. 92(8) gave provincial Legislatures the 
                                                          
4 See Municipal Affairs, Local Government (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, 2017) available online 
<https://novascotia.ca/dma/government/local-government.asp> last accessed December 10, 2017     
5 Statistics Canada, Local Government of Canada, 195 – Ontario, Archived Content, (Archived Content) (Ottawa: Government 
of Canada, 2008) available online, <https://www65.statcan.gc.ca/acyb07/acyb07_2015e-eng.htm> last accessed 
December 10, 2017 
6 See George Rust-D'Eye, Ophir Bar-Moshe, & Andrew James, Ontario Municipal Law: A User's Manual, 11th ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2017) 8.  
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right to create legal bodies for the management of municipal affairs, a right which included the 
right to amalgamate such bodies and establish their geographic boundaries”. Her Honour 
concluded, “Any ambiguity about whether a constitutional norm restricted a province from making 
changes to municipal institutions without municipal consent was resolved in that case in favour of 
the province's jurisdiction to do so”. Thus, notwithstanding s.9 Municipal Act, 2001 stipulates that 
a Municipality has a capacity, rights, power and privileged of a natural person, it is clear from 
legal principle that the natural person power is not enough to challenge the power of the Province 
to do as it wishes when it comes to Municipal affairs. Further, despite the provision under s. 3.1 
Municipal Act, 2001 that the Province acknowledges that a Municipality has the authority to enter 
into agreements with the Crown in right of Canada with respect to matters within the 
municipality’s jurisdiction, this will be in so far as such Federal-Municipal agreement does not 
challenge the Province s. 92(8) power. Considering that under s.92 (2), Provincial governments 
can levy Direct Taxation within the Province, relinquishing this power to an independent 
Municipal government without a viable alternative, could constitute financial suicide.  
Despite the provisions under Part VIII, sections 306-326 Municipal Act, 2001 that allow 
Municipalities to collect realty taxes from owners of property within their territories, there is a 
warning under s.17 (1) (a) Municipal Act, 2001 that the broad power given to the Municipalities 
does not allow them to impose taxes.7 Similarly, s.13 (1) City of Toronto Act 2006, S.O. 2006, 
c.11, Schedule A (“City of Toronto Act, 2006”) prohibits the City of Toronto from imposing any 
type of tax. Although, “in 2007, the province of Ontario effectively granted Toronto “charter-city 
status,” handing the municipal government a new arsenal of tools it could use to raise additional 
                                                          
7 See Exchange Corporation Canada Inc. v Mississauga (City), 2014 ONCA 113 
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revenue”,8 the City power to raise taxes is not unlimited. In any event, the fact that Charter is a 
privilege as opposed to a right, means that the Province can withhold anytime it chooses to do so.  
The constitutional oversight that denied Municipal government recognition as the official 
third arm of government is significant. As of the time of completing this paper in March 2018, 
there are 444 Municipalities in Ontario. Given their closeness to the community, Municipal 
governments are arguably, in a better position to deal proactively with ordinary matters of local 
nature. Water supply, transportation, parking, waste management, public utilities, drainage and 
flood control, local economic development and health and safety are just part of the vast list of 
Municipal government responsibilities. The principle of subsidiarity, an international principle to 
which the government of Canada agrees, provides that matter should be addressed by those at the 
grassroots level. “The Courts has often reiterated the social and political importance of local 
government. It has stressed that their powers must be given a generous interpretation because their 
closeness to the members of the public who live or work on their territory make them more 
sensitive to the problems experienced by those individuals” (emphasis added). 9 “The general aim 
of the principle of subsidiarity is to guarantee a degree of independence for a lower authority in 
relation to a higher body or for a local authority in relation to central government. It therefore 
involves the sharing of powers between several levels of authority, a principle which forms the 
institutional basis for federal states”.10  
                                                          
8 Harry Kitchen, “Is “Charter-City-Status” A Solution for Financing City Services in Canada – Or is That a Myth?” 
(2016)  9:2 The School of Public Policy SPP Research Papers 
9 Guignard v St-Hyacinthe (Ville) [2002], S.C.J No.16 per LeBel J at Para 16 
10 See Rosa Raffaelli, “Fact sheets on the European Union: The Principle of Subsidiarity” (Bruxelles: European 
Parliament, 2017) (no page no.) available online 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.2.2.html> last accessed December 8, 
2017 
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With the exception of the City of Toronto that operates under the City of Toronto Act 2006, 
the power of Municipal governments in Ontario is essentially derived from the Municipal Act 
2001. Section 2 Municipal Act, 2001 provides that Municipalities are created by the province as 
responsible and accountable governments with respect to matters within their jurisdiction and each 
Municipality is given powers to provide good government with respect to those matters. Section 
5(1) empowers Municipal Councils to exercise the power of the Municipality while s. 5(3) clarifies 
the exercise of this power shall be by bylaw unless the Municipality is specifically authorized to 
do otherwise. In so far as it is within their boundaries as prescribed in the Division of Ontario into 
Geographic Areas, O Reg. 180/03, Municipal governments in Ontario can make bylaws to deliver 
services as they saw fit. However, the requirement that a bylaw must comply with its enabling 
statute is quintessential as failure to do so will expose the bylaw to been declared ultravires.11  
The prescriptive nature of Municipalities area of competency is a key problems affecting 
the development of municipal law.12 Generally, the Courts will examine the enabling law to 
determine Municipalities “laundry list”. 13 If the bylaw does not fall within the list, the law is 
ultravires of the Municipality. “The doctrine of prescribed powers, then, is the main block standing 
in the way of municipal autonomy, and of modern and liberal provincial-municipal relations”.14 In 
City of Verdun v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] 1 S.C.R. 222, at para 228, Fauteux J. adopted Sir Mathias 
Tellier dictum in Phaneuf v. Corporation du Village de St-Hughes Q.R. (1936) 61 K.B. 83, 90 that 
stated, “in matters of legislation, municipal corporations have powers only those formally 
                                                          
11 See Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2; see also Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vnacouver (City), 
[1994] 1 SCR 231 
12 See John Mascarin & Christopher J. Williams, Ontario Municipal Act & Commentary Ed.(Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 
2015), 3   
13 For further discussions on laundry list, see Adam Shortt (1859-1931) and Arthur G. Doughty (1860-1936), Supra note 
6 at 429; see also Samuel Mosonyi & Dennis Baker, “Bylaw Battles: Explaining Municipal-Provincial and Municipal-
Federal Win-Rates”  (2016) 25: 2 Canadian Journal of Urban Research, 13 [Mosonyi]. 
14 Levi, Ron and Valverde, Mariana. "Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status" 
(2006) 44:3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 418. 
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delegated to them by the Legislature; and these powers, they can neither extend them nor exonerate 
them (Google Translation).” Perhaps, in realization that Municipalities need more than prescribed 
power to function efficiently, s.8 Municipal Act 2001 confers a broad power on Municipal 
governments. This functional power allows Municipalities to deal with issues they were not 
specifically assigned but, are nevertheless relevant to their local communities.  
Section 8(2) Municipal Act 2001 clarifies, in case of ambiguity in whether or not a 
municipality has the authority to pass the bylaw the ambiguity shall be resolved so as to include, 
rather than exclude. This section merely reiterates the legal principle that Canada Courts have 
adopted.15 In United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (city), 2004 SCC 19 
the Court upheld a trial judge decision that Calgary City is able to limit the number of taxi plate 
licences it can issue. Bastarache J. noted at para 17, “To determine whether a municipality is 
authorized to exercise a certain power, such as limiting the issuance of taxi plate licences, the 
provisions of the Act must be construed in a broad and purposive manner”. Similarly, in Friends 
of Lansdowne Inc. v Ottawa (City), [2012] OJ No. 1860 at para 26, the Court of Appeal reiterated 
that Municipal power must be broadly interpreted to “give effect to the purpose of the power 
conferred”. Nevertheless, functioning power cannot be used as a wild card to enact bylaws as they 
please. In 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, 
Lebel J. delivering the Minority decision, stated at para 50 that “It is not enough that a particular 
issue has become a pressing concern in the opinion of a local community.  This concern must relate 
to problems that engage the community as a local entity, not a member of the broader polity.  It 
must be closely related to the immediate interests of the community within the territorial limits 
defined by the legislature in a matter where local governments may usefully intervene.” 
                                                          
15 See Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2000 SCC 13 
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In determining the validity of bylaws enacted under s.8 Municipal Act 2001, Courts will 
look at the purpose of the bylaw. In Eng v Toronto (City), [2012] OJ No. 5661, a city of Toronto 
bylaw that prohibits the possession, sale or consumption of shark fins was held to be ultravires. 
Spence J. observed at para 19 that, “A by-law must have a proper municipal purpose otherwise, it 
falls outside the jurisdiction of the City”. If the purpose of the law is reasonable, the Courts are 
more likely to defer to the wish of the elected municipal bodies and adopt a benevolent 
interpretation of the impugned bylaw. 
In Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231, McLachlin J. 
dissenting related at para 244 that “Any ambiguity or doubt is to be resolved in favour of the citizen 
especially when the grant of power contended for is out of the "usual range".” In 114957 Canada 
Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), (Supra), the Supreme Court of Canada 
refused to strike down the City bylaw that prevents the use of lawful insecticides. In the Court’ 
view, the bylaw was enacted for a genuine Municipal purpose and its effect on the lawful use of 
insecticides is merely ancillary. Suffices it that a bylaw is “not invalid simply because of the 
existence of federal and provincial legislation dealing with same subject matter”. 16 Nevertheless, 
Courts’ scrutiny of bylaws appear to be more intense that their analysis of Federal and provincial 
law. In Burlington (City) v Burlington Airpark Inc. 2017 ONCA 420, 47, Robert JA. to whom 
other Justices concurred, related that Municipal bylaws are not “legislation” within the meaning 
of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F. This downward categorization of bylaws 
perhaps constitute an incentive for litigants who are more likely to challenge the validity of bylaws 
than they would challenge the validity of Federal or Provincial law.17 
                                                          
16 See Croplife Canada v. Toronto (City) (2005)  254 D.L.R. (4th) 40, 75 O.R. (3d) 357), leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court dismissed - SCC Case Information: 31036 
17 See Mosonyi, Supra note 12 at 11-22. 
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Notably, in Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co., 2016 SCC 54, the Supreme Court of 
Canada did not decide the key question whether a validly enacted Municipal law can be enforced 
on a federal work undertaker. The absence of such determination is significant blow to those 
Corporation who like to hide under the cloak of Federal paramountcy18 to evade compliance with 
bylaws. Rider to its power under the Municipal Act 2001 and pursuant to the Building Code Act, 
SO 1992, c.23 (“Building Code”), the City of Windsor enacted the Property Standards Bylaw, 
No. 1472011 to establish and enforce building standards in the City. The City building inspector 
issued repair orders against Canada Transit Company in respect of its acquired buildings in 
Windsor that have become decapitated.  
While the parties engaged in back and forth legal argument before the Property Standard 
Committee, Canada Transit applied to the Federal Court to declare that it is immune from the City 
bylaw. The decision of the Federal Court denying the application was upheld by the Supreme 
Court. This case highlights the evolution of bylaws, the prevailing constitutional issue in Canada, 
and the position of Municipalities in the context of the federation. Accordingly, the object of this 
research is to determine the scope of municipal law in Canada through the lens of constitutional 
arrangement, judicial determinations, and government policies. To achieve the research’ aim, the 
researcher will consider the following questions: (1) what is the legal position of bylaws in 
Canada? (2) To what extent if any, are federal project undertakers’ immune form municipal by-
laws? (3) In what way, if at all, could the relationship between municipalities, provincial and 
federal authorities be improved?  
                                                          
18 Federal paramountcy is a legal doctrine that Courts often used to protect laws enacted by the Federal government. 
The idea is that irrespective of the power given to the provinces, the Federal government can enact laws on issues 
the Constitution Act, 1867 did not specifically assign to it; so long as the law is for the benefit of the Dominion. This 
principle, which is believed to have originated from Grand Trunk v. Attorney General of Canada, [1907] A.C. 65 
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Smith v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 554, 1983 CanLII 134 (SCC) 
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Using Ontario-wide case study of jurisprudences relating to bylaws and federal undertakers 
within the last ten years, the paper will explore the origin and limit of municipal bylaws, consider 
modern issues surrounding municipalities and municipal law in Ontario, and examine the 
relevance of municipal law to federal undertakings.  
2. Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co., 2016 SCC 54 
2.1 History and Relevant Facts of the Case 
Pursuant to its power under the Municipal Act 2001 and in accordance with s.15.1 (3) of 
the Building Code Act, 1992, the City of Windsor enacted the Property Standards By-law, 
No. 147-2011 as amended. The bylaw which, became effective on September 6, 2011 established 
standards for the maintenance and occupancy of all property in the City of Windsor and made the 
contravention of the bylaw an offence punishable by penalties. The Canada Transit Company, a 
statutory company created by An Act to incorporate The Canadian Transit Company, (1921) 11-
12 Geo. V, c. 57, s. 2 owns, operates, and manages the Canadian half of the Ambassador Bridge 
connecting Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan. Under its enabling statute, the Company is 
empowered to purchase, lease or otherwise acquire and hold lands for the bridge, and to construct, 
erect and maintain buildings and other structures required for the convenient working of traffic to, 
from and over the bridge. Within its power, Canada Transit “purchased 114 properties between 
2004 and 2013 in the community of Olde Sandwich Towne in Windsor, Ontario, located 
immediately west of the Canadian side of the Ambassador Bridge”.19 Canada Transit aimed to 
demolish the buildings and use the land to facilitate the maintenance and expansion of the 
Ambassador Bridge.  
                                                          
19 See Canadian Transit Company v. Windsor (City), 2014 FC 461 (CanLII) Para 4 
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However, for whatever reason, it did not demolish the buildings and they became derelict. 
This prompted the City of Windsor Chief Building Official acting under the City bylaw, to issue 
numerous orders compelling Canada Transit to repair the properties. Canada Transit Company 
appealed these orders to the Property Standards Committee and further applied to the Federal Court 
for a declaration to the effect that it has certain rights under its enabling statute that trump the City 
bylaw and the repair orders issued under it. The Property Standard Committee “ordered that 83 of 
the 114 repair orders be modified to permit demolition as requested by the Company, and deferred 
the hearing of the appeals with respect to the remaining 31 properties pending a discussion between 
the parties”.20 On appeal, the Property Standards Committee upheld the City of Windsor’s original 
repair orders for the 31 properties but, denied the appeal in respect of orders relating to the 
remaining 83 properties. Both parties appeal to the Ontario Superior Court. Before the appeals 
could be heard, City of Windsor, in response to Canada Transit Company’s Federal Court 
application brought a motion under r. 221(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 to strike 
the Company’s notice of application on the ground that the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
the application. 
2.2 Proceeding and Decisions 
2.2.1 Federal Court - Canadian Transit Company v. Windsor (City), 2014 FC 461 (CanLII) 
The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore who rejected the Canada Transit’ application began his 
submission by making reference to Canada (National Revenue) v JP Morgan Asset Management 
(Canada) Inc., 2013 FCA 250 (CanLII) where at para 101, the Court was critical about the 
inappropriate use of judicial review. Shore J. observed that a motion to strike an application for 
want of jurisdiction is exceptional and must only apply where the application is so clearly improper 
                                                          
20 Supra note 19, at para 7 
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as to be bereft of any chance of success. He also noted that Canada Transit “does not appear to be 
challenging the legality of the City bylaw, or any order of a federal board, commission or other 
tribunal. Rather, the Company was simply seeking a legal opinion regarding the applicability of 
own stature from the Court” (emphasis added).21 The judge concluded, “It is plain and obvious 
that Canada Transit application lacks a reasonable cause of action and that it is bereft of any 
possibility of success”.22  
2.2.2 Federal Court of Appeal - [2016] 1 FCR 265, 2015 FCA 88 (CanLII) 
Reversing Shore J’s decision, the Federal Court of Appeal held, the Federal Court has 
jurisdiction to determine the Company’s application. Stratas J.A whose decision was concurred by 
Dawson and Scott JJ.A rejected Shore J’s preposition that the Company’s resort to the Federal 
Court for relief constitutes an abuse of process. He concluded that the application was correctly 
lodged under paragraph 23(c) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C 1985, c. F-7 (“Federal Court Act 
1985”). Stratas J.A considered the test for Federal Court jurisdiction established in ITO-Int'l 
Terminal Operators v. Miida Electronics, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 (“ITO”) and concluded, Canada 
Transit application met the test.  
2.2.3 Supreme Court - [2016] 2 SCR 617, 2016 SCC 54 (CanLII) 
In divided ratio 5: (3+1), the Supreme Court of Canada allowed City of Windsor appeal, 
set aside and Federal Court of Appeal decision, and reinstated the order of the Federal Court 
striking Canada Transit’s notice of application. The majority, McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell, 
Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon JJ held, Federal Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide 
whether the City’s by-law applies to the Company’s residential properties.  
                                                          
21 Ibid, at Para 12 
22 Ibid 
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Karakatsanis J. who wrote the majority’s decision opined that the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice is the best forum. Her Honour, who disagreed with the Federal Court of appeal that the 
essential nature of Canada Transit claims fell within the scope of s.23(c) Federal Court Act, 1985 
observed at para 58-59 that “The essence of the Company’s position is that the By-law is 
inapplicable by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity or inoperative by the doctrine of 
paramountcy. The Company is seeking relief under constitutional law, because it is constitutional 
law which confers on parties the right to seek a declaration that a law is inapplicable or inoperative. 
A party seeking relief under constitutional law is not seeking relief “under an Act of Parliament or 
otherwise” within the meaning of s.23”. Karakatsanis J concluded, Canada Transit was merely 
seeking a declaration that it is immune from the City of Windsor by-law. Such request Karakatsanis 
J concludes, is outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Court.  
Moldaver, Côté and Brown JJ dissenting, supported the Federal Court of Appeal position 
that the Federal court has jurisdiction to deal with the application by virtue of s.23 (c) Federal 
Court Act, 1985 and in line with the principle set out in the ITO case. In their judgement that was 
concurrently delivered by Moldover and Brown JJ., they argued, “Where relief is claimed under 
this constitutional doctrine relating to a federal work or undertaking, federal law will be essential 
to the disposition of the case”.23 Citing the dictum of Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western 
Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 39 the Minority argued “Interjurisdictional immunity 
protects the exclusivity of certain powers from interference by the other level of government. It 
was originally developed “to protect federally incorporated companies from provincial legislation 
affecting the essence of the powers conferred on them as a result of their incorporation”.24   
                                                          
23 Canadian Transit Company v. Windsor (City), 2016 SCC 54, at para 109 
24 Ibid at para 110  
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In a statement highly critical of Karakatsanis J. findings, the Minority argued, “This case 
involves a federal company, created under a specially enacted federal statute, whose sole function 
under the statute is to operate a federal undertaking and whose claim for declaratory relief focusses 
exclusively on its right to carry out its statutory mandate free from unconstitutional constraints 
imposed by municipal bylaws”.25 
Meanwhile, Abella J also dissenting, agreed with Karakatsanis J. on the role and 
jurisdiction generally of the Federal Court but joined Moldaver and Brown JJ. In holding that the 
criteria under s.23 of the Federal Courts Act 1985 and the ITO test for Federal Court jurisdiction 
are met. Nevertheless, unlike Moldaver and Brown JJ, Abella J would have dismissed the appeal 
and direct that a stay of the Federal Court proceedings be entered. 
2.3 Analysis and Commentary 
Section 101 Constitution Act, 1867 provides that “The Parliament of Canada may, 
notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, 
Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the 
Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada”. 
Accordingly, the federal government established the Federal Court to replace the Court of 
Exchequer in 1971. Section 23 of the current Federal Courts Act, 1985 states:  
Except to the extent that jurisdiction has been otherwise specially assigned, the Federal 
Court has concurrent original jurisdiction … in all cases in which a claim for relief is 
made or a remedy is sought under an Act of Parliament or otherwise in relation to …..: 
(c) Works and undertakings connecting a province with any other province or 
extending beyond the limits of a province. 
                                                          
25 Supra, note 23 at para 118 
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The Supreme Court decision in Canadian Transit Company v. Windsor (City) (Supra) 
raised a legal point on the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. Both the Minority and the Majority in 
the decision agree the Federal Court unlike the Superior Court if Justice, is not a Court of inherent 
jurisdiction. Federal Court can have jurisdiction over a matter if it falls under s.23 Federal Courts 
Act 1985 and or the test under the ITO case is satisfied. This include, (1) there must be a statutory 
grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Court; (2) federal law must be essential to the disposition of the 
case; and (3) the law at issue must be validly federal. Considering the wording of s.23(c) Federal 
Courts Act, 1985 holistically, one may be tempted to agree with the Minority that the position 
taken by the Majority is too restrictive. Canada Transit enabling statute is a Federal legislation. 
The statute empowers the Company to acquire properties as it had, the work carried on by the 
Company related to Federal undertakings within the meaning of s.23(c). Literarily, by asking the 
Company to repair its buildings, the City of Windsor is interfering. It is therefore fair that Canada 
Transit should be able to request a declaration of interference from the Federal Court. On the same 
argument, the test under the ITO case is can be accomplished.  
Nevertheless, the stance of the Majority is commendable. It is plain an obvious that the 
City of Windsor was only asking Canada Transit to act as any law abiding citizen in Windsor 
would. It would have set a dangerous precedent for the efficacy of Municipal bylaws had the 
Supreme court ruled that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court – that would 
have implied that the bylaw is prima facie interfering with the work of Canada Transit. The ruling 
that the Superior Court is the court of jurisdiction for a matter of this nature means that federal 
work undertaker could no longer wave paramountcy as a magic wand. The decision invariably 
raises the bar for federal undertakers who might be seeking immunity from bylaws.  
16 
 
2.3.1 The Legality and Applicability of the Property Standards Bylaw, No. 1472011 
The City of Windsor bylaw, passed on September 6, 2011 and amended on December 5, 
2011, established standards for the maintenance and occupancy of all property in the City. It is 
clear that the bylaw is a law of general application and was not specifically directed at Canada 
Transit or its operations in the City.  The City of Windsor is empowered under s.11 (3)7 Municipal 
Act, 2001 to pass bylaw in respect of “structures, including fences and signs”. The structure in this 
regard, is building structure. Further, the 114 properties purchased by Canada Transit in Windsor 
were residential properties. Section 99.1 (1) Municipal Act, 2001 allows the City of Windsor to 
prohibit the demolition or regulate the conversion of residential properties to a purpose other that 
the purpose of a residential rental property. The City is further empowered to enact bylaw under 
s. 99.1(2) (a) (b) prohibiting Canada Transit from demolishing the residential properties it has 
acquired. It is clear in Windsor v Canada Transit case that the City did not exercise any of these 
powers. In Toronto (City) v. Goldlist Properties Inc., 2003 CanLII 50084 (ON CA), the City of 
Toronto approved an amendment to its official plan, which established a series of policies aimed 
at preserving, maintaining and replenishing the supply of rental housing throughout the City. 
Several property owners, developers and associations of owners of rental residential property, 
including Goldlist requested the Ontario Municipal Board to find the bylaw ultravires of the City. 
The ruling of the Divisional Court that overturned Ontario Municipal Board decision was upheld 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the self-restraint exercised by the City of Windsor 
not to prevent Canada Transit from acquiring the residential buildings is highly commendable. 
Since Canada Transit acquired those buildings so it could use the land, the City is right not to 
prevent the purchase which could have been interpreted as a constraint in the ability of Canada 
Transit to carry on its official role. But, just because Canada Transit could acquire those properties 
does not give it the right to do as it wishes regardless.  
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Section 99.1(4) Municipal Act, 2001 clarifies that in the event any building-related bylaw 
made under the Act clashes with the Building Code Act, 1992, S.O 1992 c. 23, the restriction under 
the Building Code prevails. Section 15.1 (3) of the Building Code Act, 1992 empowered the City 
to pass a bylaw prescribing standards for the maintenance and occupancy of property within the 
municipality, prohibiting the occupancy or use of such property that does not conform with the 
standards, and requiring property that does not conform with the standards to be repaired and 
maintained to conform with the standards. So, the City of Windsor Property Standards By-law that 
Canada Transit had issue with was properly passed within the City power. It is only fair that a 
company should not be allowed to hide under the cloak of Federal work or undertaking to evade a 
valid bylaw. The City was not trying to teach Canada Transit how to do its Bridge building and 
maintenance job, the City was merely telling the Company to behave as any law abiding citizen in 
the city of Windsor will do. Canada Transit failed to demolish the building after purchasing them 
for that purpose. It is fair in this case that the City of Windsor is able to order Canada Transit to 
put its derelicts buildings in a repair state. As such Karakatsanis J. judgement is proactive, and 
reflects a contemporary reality in Municipal law.  
3. Comparative Study 
The idea that Federal work undertakers are free from Province or Municipal interference 
is a myth that has its origin in the earlier Dominion cases related to Crown Corporations.26 This 
springs from the notion that the Crown is not subordinate to anyone. Telecommunications is one 
of the lengthily litigated matters in Canada. In City of Toronto v Bell Telephone Co., [1905] AC 
52, the Privy Council recognized Telecommunication as a Federal matter and ruled that City of 
                                                          
26 See for instance, Hodge v The Queen (Canada). UKPC. 1883. 59; The Attorney General for Ontario v The Attorney General for 
the Dominion of Canada, and the Distillers and Brewers’ Association of Ontario [1896] UKPC 20; and The Grand Trunk Railway 
Company of Canada v The Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada [1906] UKPC 72 
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Toronto cannot frustrate the ability of Bell Telephone to carry on its statutory duty. Similarly, in 
John Deere Plow Co., v Wharton, [1915] A.C 330 the Court held that Federal Corporations enjoy 
immunity from otherwise valid provincial legislation. Considering that Municipalities derive their 
law making power form the Province, it is not strange that Courts are more inclined to scrutinize 
Municipal bylaws.27 Recently, in Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), 2016 SCC 
23, the Court found that Châteauguay had acted in bad faith in its attempt to frustrate the mandate 
of Rogers Communications.  
Further, in Canada Post Corporation v. Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767, Canada Post 
decided to end door to door mail delivery and install community mailboxes instead. The move was 
objected to by Hamilton City. In what may be seen as retaliation, the City rolled out bylaws that 
prevent the installation of mail boxes on municipal roads. The Superior Court held the bylaw was 
ultravires of the Municipality and the Court of Appeal agrees. The common element in both the 
telecommunications and Canada post decisions is that the impugned bylaws were made with a 
view to control all or certain aspect of the activity of a federal work undertaker. It the Courts are 
more likely to side with federal work undertakers where a bylaw or provincial law appears to make 
the performance of their work uneasy.  
That said, the Courts are not anti-bylaws. Even in the area of Maritime which appears to 
be specifically assigned to the federal under s.91 (10), Courts have accommodate bylaws where 
the purpose of the bylaw is not to legislate on Maritime but deal with genuine matters of local 
nature. In R v. Latouche, 2010 ABPC 166, a Calgary bylaw that mandated the wearing of 
lifejackets on a waterway was held not in violation of the federal power over navigation. By 
contrast, Court held in Marcoux  v. St-Charles-de-Bellechasse (Municipalité de), 2015 CanLII 
                                                          
27 See John Mascarin and Christopher J. Williams, Supra note 12 at 3  
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59742 that the Municipal bylaw restricting the types of vessels that could be operated on a lake 
was ultravires of the City, it is easy to spot that Courts have drawn a line between legislating to 
control and legislating to deal with issues of local nature.  
Furthermore, in criminal law, the Courts refused to simply interpret all criminal related law 
as solely s.91 Federal power. In R v Sault Ste-Marie (City of) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, Dickson C.J 
in recognised three categories of crimes namely, true crimes, strict liability, and absolute liability. 
This recognition clarifies the important of provincial offences vis a vis municipal offences that can 
be properly constituted under s.92. In Smith v St. Albert (City), 2014 ABCA 76, the Court held that 
a provision of the City of Edmonton’s business license bylaw that restricts the sale and display of 
illicit drug consumption related items is properly enacted within the municipality’s power and that 
the bylaw does not constitute an unlawful intrusion into s.91(27) power.  
Similarly, in York (Regional Municipality) v. Tsui, 2017 ONCA 230, the City of Vaughan 
passed a bylaw to regulate the operation of body rub parlours in its jurisdiction. Tsui, who operates 
a licensed body rub parlour in the City was charged with contravening the section of the bylaw 
governing operating hours. The Justice of Peace agreed the bylaw is a pornography prohibition 
law in disguise, and the Ontario Court of Justice concurred. But, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
overturned that decision and ordered a new trial.  
In Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46, the 
Supreme Court affirmed at para 32 that “A provincial statute will not invade the federal power 
over criminal law merely because its purpose is to target conduct that is also captured by the 
Criminal Code”. Similarly, in Canadian Indemnity Co. et al. v. A.G. of British Columbia, [1977] 
2 S.C.R. 504, 518,  Martland J. reiterated the dictum of McGillivray J.A., who in Rex v. Arcadia 
Coal Co. [1932] 1 W.W.R. 771, 778 observed,  “A provincial Legislature may enact laws, 
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province-wide, of general application (i.e., including the public generally) in respect of any of the 
subjects enumerated in sec. 92 and in so doing may completely paralyse all activities of a 
Dominion trading company provided that in the enactment of such laws it does not enter the field 
of company law and in that field encroach upon the status and powers of a Dominion company as 
such”.  
4. Conclusion 
A review of the court decision in Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co., 2016 SCC 54, 
as well as an examination of Ontario-wide jurisprudence on the applicability of bylaws to Federal 
undertakers have shown that some bylaws can withstand constitutional challenge. The doctrine of 
Federal paramountcy prevents Municipal governments from enacting bylaws for the purpose of, 
or in an attempt to regulate or control the activity of a Federal work undertaker in their territory. 
However, in conducting a pith and substance analysis to determine the validity of a bylaw that 
encroached into federal areas of power, the court will look at the purpose of the bylaw to determine 
whether it has been properly made. Where the purpose of a bylaw is primarily to serve genuine 
community interest but, the law incidentally controls the activity of Federal work undertaker, the 
bylaw is most likely to be upheld. A bylaw will not be ultravires simply because it deals with 
issues or areas of law that the Federal or Provincial government have competency.   
In Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co., the court heard that City of Windsor Property 
Standard bylaw applied uniformly to all buildings in the City. The court held his general 
application can not be interpreted as a direct control of the activity of Canada Transit or an 
infringement on the company’s constitutional rights as a Federal work undertaker. Canada Transit 
was prevented from hiding under the cloak of federal paramountcy to deal with its dilapidated 
buildings as any other owner or caretaker in Windsor will do.  
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5. Recommendation 
Municipal councils and bylaws drafters must take notice that the law they make, has 
genuine community purpose. Given its important role in reaching out to the community, the 
province should entrenched Municipal law so, it cannot be easily abrogated. This will help secure 
the future of Municipal governments and further improves the efficacy of bylaws. 
